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Introduction 
Doing comparison is man‟s „business as usual‟. Even the simple 
person does it in his daily affairs in order to get a better choice. 
However, to do it scholarly or scientifically has been evidently and 
exceptionally the concern of sophisticated minds throughout the ages. 
Especially when the comparison involves belief systems or religions 
toward which complete neutrality or objectivity is almost impossible.
1
 
Hence arose the important question on “who should carry out the 
exercise” and “how it should be carried out” in the long and fierce 
debates among the scholars and students of modern study of religions. 
As for the former, there seems to be no conclusive and objective 
answer as to whether the student of comparative study of religions 
must be a religious or non-religious person (skeptic and atheist). And it 
is quite unlikely to have such an answer,
2
 since the very question is 
actually problematic. Because, in the final analysis, man has never 
been human, and cannot continue to be so, without a “set of value” in 
which he/she believes to be the ultimate truth, so that based upon this 
“set of value”, he/she judges, evaluates, and selects. Accordingly, it 
will certainly make no difference whether we call it religion or not.
3
  
                                                   
1 Yet according to Søren Kierkegaard, “religion is something that toward which neutrality is 
not possible.” [Quoted in Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 9].  
2 Geoffrey Parrinder, for instance, tries to discuss in his Comparative Religion the question and 
concludes finally with an answer which is in favour of the religious. [Geoffrey Parrinder, 
Comparative Religion (London: Sheldon Press, [1962] 1976), pp. 65, 120]. 
3 That religion has been the main source and supplier of value is self-evident and commonly 
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Whilst the latter, apparently the major discussions are addressed 
mainly to the issue of “descriptiveness-normativeness” or “objectivity-
subjectivity” along with the types of approach to the study of religions 
(i.e., psychological, sociological, anthropological, historical, 
phenomenological, etc.),
4
 neglecting the issue of what we may call 
“representation”, which is equally (if not more) important to be taken 
into account, in order for the study to have its expected validity, 
credibility and commendability. This is true especially when the study 
involves a comparison between two or more religions. Otherwise, in 
the absence of the valid representation, it will be invalid, non-credible 
and non-commendable.  
However, as far as my humble readings can tell, there are only very 
few scholars who really have paid due attention to this issue of 
“representation”, although many of them may have implemented this 
principle implicitly in their works. From the classical scholars, among 
these few, is Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d.381 AH/922 CE),5 a prominent 
Muslim philosopher, who deliberately addressed this issue and made it 
crystal clear in the introduction to his work on “comparative study of 
religion” under the title al-Iʿlām bi-Manāqib al-Islām, in which he 
compared “six world religions” between each other.6 He was fully 
                                                                                                                        
undeniable. But evidently, the ideologies and isms have remarkably functioned the same 
throughout the ages. In this regard, Paul Tillich observed that: 
The outside observer is always an inside participant with a part of his being, for he also 
has confessed or concealed answers to the questions which underlie every form of 
religion. If does not profess a religion proper, he nevertheless belongs to a quasi-religion, 
and as consequence he also selects, judges, and evaluates. [Paul Tillich, Christianity and 
the Encounter of the World Religions (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 
1963), p. 2]. 
Since by design they are usually meant as alternative to religions proper, some modern 
scholars simply call them “quasi-religions” [see: Paul Tillich, op. cit.], or “worldviews”, 
“semi-religions”, “weltanschauungs” [see: Ninian Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred: An 
Anatomy of the World’s Beliefs (London: Harper Collins, 1996)]. 
4 See a critical analysis of this issue: Anis Malik Thoha, “Objectivity and the Study of 
Religion,” in Intellectual Discourse, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2009, pp. 83-92. 
5 He is Muḥammad ibn Abī Dharr Yūsuf al-ʿĀmirī al-Nīsābūrī, well-known as Abū al-Ḥasan 
al-ʿĀmirī, born in Nīsābūr in the beginnings of 4th century AH, died in the same city in 381 
AH/922 CE. [Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿĀmirī, al-Iʿlām bi-Manāqib al-Islām, edited by 
Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Ghurāb (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī li al-Ṭibāʿati wa al-Nashr, 1387 
AH/1967 CE), p. 6]. 
6 Based on the Qur‟anic āyah 17, sūrah al-Ḥajj: 
﴿ڤ  ٹ    ٹ  ٹ  ٹ  ٿ  ٿ  ٿ  ٿ     ٺ  ٺ  ٺ  ٺ  ڀ  ڀ  ڀڤ    ڤ  ڤ
ڄ  ڦ    ڦ     ڦ  ڦ﴾  ، 




aware that many of the writers and researchers had, wittingly or 
unwittingly, ignored this important issue. Further he said: 
The description of merit of a thing against the other by way of comparing 
between the two could be right or otherwise. The right form is subject to two 
conditions. First, one must not make comparison except between the two similar 
types, i.e. he must not resort purposely to the noblest thing in this, then he 
compares it with the lowest in its counterpart; nor must he resort purposely to a 
principle among the principles of this, then he compares it with a branch among 
the branches of the other. Second, one must not resort purposely to a qualified 
property in some sect, which is not extensive in its whole, but then he attributes 
it to all of its classes. 
Whenever the intelligent one observes these two conditions in comparing 
between things it will be easy for him to fulfill all the portions of comparisons 
adhering to the right in his exercise.
 7
  
Regardless of whether al-ʿĀmirī, in his work, was committed to what 
he had stated above or not (this is subject to further research), it is 
worth emphasizing here that these two principles of comparative study 
espoused by him in this passage – i.e., (i) the two (or more) objects of 
comparison must be of the same level in all respects, and (ii) each of 
them must be the qualified “representative” of its constituents – are 
logically and incontestably self-evident. 
Meanwhile, among the modern scholars in the comparative study of 
religion, who have the same concern is Robert Charles Zaehner (1913-
1974). He stated vividly in his Mysticism: Sacred and Profane that: 
It is quite absurd, for example, to quote the late philosophic mystic, Ibn al-
„Araby, as an authentic exponent of the Muslim Tradition since he has been 
rejected by the majority of the orthodox as being heretical.... Such a ‘method’ has 
nothing to commend it. It merely serves to irritate those who are genuinely 
puzzled by the diversity of the world‟s great religions.8  
                                                                                                                        
Al-ʿĀmirī confined the number of world religions to six only: Islam, Judaism, Sabeanism, 
Christianity, Magianism, and Polytheism. [see Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿĀmirī, op. cit.] 
7 The original Arabic text is as follows: 
أطخ نُكٌ دقَ بثاُص نُكٌ دق بمٍىٍث دلاثبقمنا تسحث ءًشنا ىهػ ءًشنا خهٍضف نبٍجت نإ . حزُصَ
هٍئٍشث خقهؼم ةاُصنا :بمٌدحأ : بم فسشأ ىنإ دمؼٌ لاأ ًىػأ ،خسوبجتمنا لبكشلأا هٍث لاإ خسٌبقمنا غقٌُ لاأ
ف بم لذزأث ًسٍقٍف ارٌ ًفكاذ عَسف هم عسفث ًهثبقٍف ارٌ لُصأ هم مصأ ىنإ دمؼٌَ ،ًجحبص ي .سخَاَ :
بٍتبقجط خهمج ىنإ بٍجسىٍف ،بٍتفبك ًف خضٍفتسم سٍغ ،قسفنا هم خقسف ًف خفُصُم خهخ ىنإ دمؼٌ لاأ. 
 ظُظح خٍفُت ًف رخأمنا ًٍهػ مٍس دقف هٍٍىؼمنا هٌرٌ ىهػ ءبٍشلأا هٍث خهثبقمنا ًف مقبؼنا عفبح ىتمَ
يسمأ ًف ةاُصهن بمشلام نبكَ ،دلاثبقمنا .[al-ʿĀmirī, op. cit., p. 127] .
8 R. C. Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred and Profane (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 
p. 31. (emphasis added). 
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It is clear that, according to both al-ʿĀmirī and Zaehner, in order 
for the comparative study of religions to be credible and 
commendable, it must fulfill the requirements of “representation” 
adequately.  
 
Preliminary Assessment of Izutsu’s Approach 
Perhaps, the book entitled Sufism and Taoism is the only work of 
Professor Toshihiko Izutsu (1914-1993) which might fall under the 
discipline of comparative study of religion, in its narrowest sense. 
Although it is unclear whether he has purposely wished it to be so or 
not, yet he did make it clear that it is a work meant for a comparison. 
Moreover, according to him, it is a structural comparison between the 
two “worldviews” – one of which is sufistic (Islamic) and the other 
Taoist, that have no historical connection. He said further: 
[T]he main purpose of the present work in its entirety is to attempt a structural 
comparison between the worldview of Sufism [Islam] as represented by Ibn 
ʿArabī and the worldview of Taoism as represented by Lao-tzŭ and Chuang-
tzŭ…. 
[T]he dominant motive running through the entire work is the desire to open a 
new vista in the domain of comparative philosophy and mysticism.
9
 
The term “worldview” and “weltanschauung” is increasingly used in 
the contemporary religious and philosophical studies to mean religion 
exchangeably.
10
 And on top of that, the work is deliberately written by 
the author to facilitate the existing inter-cultural and inter-religious 
dialogue by providing an alternative ground to the current practices, 
which he calls “meta-historical or transhistorical dialogue”, borrowing 
Professor Henri Corbin‟s term “un dialogue dans la métahistoire”.11  
Hence, the main task of this essay is focusing exclusively on this 
particular issue of approach used by Professor Izutsu in this particular 
work, in order to assess the extent to which it is logically and 
comparatively adequate, credible and commendable. No doubt at all that 
his extensive study of the key philosophical concepts of Ibn ʿArabī 
                                                   
9 Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, [1983] 1984), p. 1. (emphasis 
added) 
10 See the footnote 3 above. 
11 Ibid., p. 2. 




(1165-1240) and Lao-tzŭ and Chuang-tzŭ, taken independently, is 
exceptionally excellent, as so are his other works seem to be. However, 
when it is seen from a comparative perspective properly, taking into 
account that it is principally meant by the author as a comparative study 
– and not just any comparison but a structural comparison between the 
two worldviews, a crucial question is indeed in order. It is a question on 
whether the issue of representation for these two worldviews has been 
addressed adequately in this work or not. In other words, whether the 
representatives (figures and thoughts) selected by Izutsu in this work do 
represent adequately the two worldviews respectively, that is, Ibn ʿArabī 
for Sufism and Lao-tzŭ and Chuang-tzŭ for Taoism. 
As far as Taoism is concerned, I think nobody will dispute or 
disagree with Izutsu. For all scholars (insiders as well as outsiders) on 
this religion unanimously recognized Lao-tzŭ and Chuang-tzŭ as 
founders of Taoism, and their thoughts as representing the mainstream 
of Taoism.
12
 Thus, such a question of representation does no longer 
arise. (Therefore, this essay will not touch this issue with regard to 
Taoism). But the case is totally different with regard to Ibn ʿArabī in 
Sufism, let alone in Islam. Although his followers and admirers 
recognized him as al-Shaykh al-Akbar (the greatest master),
13
 his 
thoughts are by no means the mainstream of Sufism. Yet, contrary to 
that, they are considered by the majority of ʿulamā’ (Muslim scholars) 
as deviating from the mainstream of Sufism and, above all, of Islamic 
thought in general. The main charge against Ibn ʿArabī is his unusual 
and unorthodox thought which is commonly identified as pantheism, 
the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd). Since this line of sufistic 
thought has never been known in the early tradition of Islam, 
especially in the Prophet‟s tradition, the Muslim scholars tend to 
consider it as heresy or heterodoxy (bidʿah).14 Hence, later on, many of 
                                                   
12 All references on world religions and faiths confirm this fact. See for instance: Huston 
Smith, Religions of Man (New York, Cambridge, London: Perennia Library – Harper & Row 
Publishers, [1958] 1965); Ninian Smart, The Religious Experience of Mankind (Glasgow: 
Collins Fount Paperbacks, [1969] 12th impression 1982); S. A. Nigosian, World Faiths (New 
York: St. Martin Press, 1994). 
13 The title of al-Shaykh al-Akbar (the greatest master) for Ibn ʿArabī became well-known after 
Sultan Salim I issued a decree in 922 AH to build a mosque in Damascus on the name of this 
Sufi master. [See Dr. Muḥammad ʿAlī Ḥājj Yūsuf, Shams al-Gharb: Sīrah al-Shaykh al-Akbar 
Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī wa-Madhhabuh (Aleppo: Dār Fuṣṣilat, 1427/2006), p. 16]. 
14 See for instance: Taqiyy al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm ibn Taymiyyah in his Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, 
Vol. 2, p. 143; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn in his Muqaddimah, (Beirut: Dār wa Maktabah 
al-Hilāl, 1983), pp. 206, 297; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān Al-Dhahabī, 
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the contemporary Muslim scholars, such as Abū al-Wafā‟ al-Taftāzānī, 
term it as “heretical Sufism” (al-taṣawwuf al-bidʿī) to be distinguished 
from the one which is “traditional” (al-taṣawwuf al-sunnī) following 
the mainstream tradition of Islam. And because the former is more 
philosophical in nature, it is also known as “philosophical Sufism” (al-
taṣawwuf al-falsafī).15 At any rate, the foregoing discussion has clearly 
shown that the place of Ibn ʿArabī in Sufism is far beyond the 
mainstream. Therefore, any attempt to introduce this Shaykh as 
representative of Sufism is methodologically questionable.  
This question becomes more vibrant, pertinent and crucial when 
the comparative study is meant specifically as an attempt to embark on 
propagating certain agenda (be it ideological, philosophical or 
religious), such as philosophia perennis which is very controversial 
and to which Professor Izutsu seems to belong and subscribe ardently, 
or, rather idealizes. It is well-established that scholars in the discipline 
of comparative study of religion are particularly very sensitive to such 
an agenda, emphasizing the necessity to freeing it from any sort of 
attempts that would eventually divert and disqualify its neutrality and 
objectivity. Regardless of the question pertaining to the possibility and 
impossibility of full-fledge neutrality and objectivity, Izutsu rather 
spells this agenda out clearly following his conviction with “un 
dialogue dans la métahistoire” or “meta-historical or transhistorical 
dialogue”, as he states: 
And meta-historical dialogues, conducted methodologically, will, I believe, 
eventually be crystallized into a philosophia perennis in the fullest sense of the 
term. For the philosophical drive of the human Mind is, regardless of ages, 
places and nations, ultimately and fundamentally one. 




Although philosophia perennis, as a school of philosophy, badly needs 
in itself to be studied and analyzed further, but since the main concern 
of this essay is on the issue of methodological approach employed by 
                                                                                                                        
in his Siyar al-Aʿlām al-Nubalā’, Vol. 23 (Beyrut: Mu‟assasat al-Risālah, 11th Printing, 1422 
H./2001M.), pp. 48-9. 
15 Further detail, see for instance: Dr. Abū al-Wafā‟ al-Ghunaymī al-Taftāzānī, al-Madkhal ilā 
al-Taṣawwuf al-Islāmī (Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfah, 1988); and Abū Muḥammad Raḥīm al-Dīn 
Nawawī al-Bantanī, Madkhal ilā al-Taṣawwuf al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Islāmī (Cairo: Dār al-Amān, 1424 
H./2003 M.). 
16 Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, p. 469. (emphasis in the second paragraph added) 




Izutsu, we should confine ourselves to this approach leaving aside the 




It is interesting to note, nevertheless, that Izutsu‟s perennial 
tendency is not clearly spelt out in any of his works other than Sufism 
and Taoism. Not even in his The Concept and Reality of the 
Existence
18
 and God and Man in the Koran
19
 which are rightly 
supposed to address the point elaboratively and clearly. Probably this 
is the main reason why many of the students and scholars on Izutsu fail 
to notice this point. For instance, in his presentation under the title 
“Communicating Pure Consciousness Events: Using Izutsu to address 
A Problem in the Philosophy of Mysticism,” Dr. Sajjad H. Rizvi from 
University of Exeter, UK, on the conviction of the possibility of „pure 
consciousness experience‟ (PCE) of mystical experience, tried all out 
to argue that Izutsu is far from being a perennialist,
20
 ignoring the very 
fact of text written by himself above which is quite straight forward 
and, thus, obviously self-evident. Indeed, even in this latter work of 
Izutsu, a careful and meticulous reading of the chapter “Existentialism 
East and West,” will surely show, though by way of inference, the 
perennial tendency of Izutsu. He says: 
…. Then we shall notice with amazement how close these two kinds of 
philosophy [Western existentialism and Islamic existentialism] are to each other 
in their most basic structure. For it will become evident to us that both go back to 
one and the same root of experience, or primary vision, of the reality of 
existence. This primary vision is known in Islam as aṣālat al-wujūd, i.e. the 
“fundamental reality of existence”.21 
The phrase “both go back to one and the same root of experience, or 
primary vision, of the reality of existence,” is a typical expression of 
                                                   
17 There are studies on the perennial philosophy or Sophia perennis. And I have a humble 
contribution to this study in my book, Al-Taʿaddudiyyah al-Dīniyyah: Ru’yah Islāmiyyah 
(Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press, 2005). 
18 Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of the Existence (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of 
Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1971). 
19 Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran: Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung 
(North Stratford: Ayer Co. Publisher, [1964] repr. 2002). 
20 Sajjad H. Rizvi, “Communicating Pure Consciousness Events: Using Izutsu to Address A 
Problem in the Philosophy of Mysticism,” a paper presented in the International Conference 
on Contemporary Scholarship on Islam: Japanese Contribution to Islamic Studies – The 
Legacy of Toshihiko Izutsu, International Islamic University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 5-7 
August 2008, and is included in this volume, pp. 157-170. 
21 Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of the Existence, p. 27. (emphasis added) 
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the perennialism (Sophia Perennis or al-Ḥikmah al-Khālidah). “The 
Masters”22 of this school of philosophy expressed it differently: René 
Guénon (1886-1951) used a phrase the Multiple States of Being;
23
 
Aldous Huxley (1894-1963), in The Perennial Philosophy, 
paraphrased it as “the Highest Common Factor;”24 Frithjof Schuon 
(1907-1998) and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b. 1933) called it the 
Transcendent Unity of Religion.
25
 In fact, Izutsu‟s Sufism and Taoism 
is comparable to one of René Guénon‟s posthumous collections 




Why not Islam and Taoism? 
The foregoing analysis might lead eventually to such questions as, 
firstly, why Izutsu deliberately chooses Sufism and Taoism for his 
comparative study, rather than Islam and Taoism; and, secondly, why he 
chooses Sufism of Ibn ʿArabī per se among the prominent sufi figures. 
Of course, only Izutsu does know exactly the precise answer to this 
question. However, in the discipline of comparative study of religion 
today, scholars have discussed extensively the hypothetical definition of 
religion, and, thus, come up with some sort of typology of religions. 
Some of them have attempted to classify religions into “mystical” and 
“prophetic”, emphasizing that mysticism is “the highest type of 
religions”, as was commonly suggested by perennialists and 
transcendentalists. Accordingly, it is quite convenient for them to do a 
comparative study between Sufism and Taoism. Indeed, as I have just 
mentioned above, René Guénon wrote articles published later on in his 
posthumous collections entitled Insights into Islamic Esoterism and 
Taoism. From this perspective, Izutsu‟s Sufism and Taoism has been 
considered by some contemporary scholars, such as Professor Kojiro 
                                                   
22 In his works, Seyyed Hossein Nasr calls René Guénon, Ananda Coomaraswamy and Frithjof 
Schuon as “The Masters”. 
23 René Guénon, The Multiple States of Being, (Hillsdale, NY: Sophia Perennis, [1932] 2002).  
24 Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (London: Fontana Books, [1944] 3rd impression 1961). 
25 Frithjof Schuon, Esoterism as Principle and as Way, translated from French by William 
Stoddart (Pates Manor, Bedfont, Middlesex: Perennial Books, [1978] 1981); and his The 
Transcendent Unity of Religions, translated from French by Peter Townsend (New York, 
London: Harper Torchbooks, [1948] 1975); also Seyyed Hossein Nasr, „The Philosophia 
Perennis and the Study of Religion,‟ in Frank Whaling (ed.), The World’s Religious Traditions: 
Current Perspectives in Religious Studies, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1984), pp. 181-200; and 
his Knowledge and the Sacred (Lahore: Suhail Academy, [1981] 1988). 
26 René Guénon, Insights into Islamic Esoterism and Taoism (Hillsdale, NY: Sophia Perennis, 2003). 




Nakamura, a prominent Japanese scholar in comparative religion,
27
 as a 
significant contribution which might offer a new vista in the field of 
comparative religion and interreligious dialogue. But then, whether 
Sufism is mysticism is actually a highly debatable question that badly 
needs further research and study. What is clear from the above 
discussion is that, as far as the Muslim scholars are concerned, they 
distinguished Sufism into sunnī (traditional) and falsafī (philosophical). 
And even if philosophical Sufism could be readily labeled mysticism, it 
represents only a part, nay a small part, of Sufism. 
As for the second question, it seems that Izutsu‟s selection of Ibn 
ʿArabī, and not other ṣūfī figures, as the representative of Sufism is 
simply because the main interest of Izutsu is actually to establish what 
he called a “common language” which, according to him, is a 
necessary ground for the projected meta-historical dialogues could be 
made possible. He put it as follows: 
These considerations would seem to lead us to a very important methodological 
problem regarding the possibility of meta-historical dialogues. The problem 
concerns the need of a common linguistic system. This is only natural because 




Yet, this “common language”, which is in the form of “key-terms 
and concepts”, is hardly to be found in the predominant and 
“authoritative” Islamic thought (kalām) and philosophy that are 
grounded directly on the Qur‟anic and Sunnatic (traditional) principles 
as well-represented in the thoughts and works of, for instance, al-
Ghazālī,29 al-Qushayrī30 and the likes. Somehow, this is a matter of 
fact that has been recognized and realized by Izutsu himself indirectly 
when he wrote his God and Man in the Koran, in which he dealt with 
these two grand key-terms and concepts mainly from Qur‟anic 
perspective. In this work, the “common language”, in the sense of that 
which he wanted eagerly to establish in his comparison between 
Sufism and Taoism, is completely absent, though the main thrust of the 
                                                   
27 Kojiro Nakamura, “The Significance of Izutsu‟s Legacy for Comparative Religion,” a paper 
presented in the International Conference on Contemporary Scholarship on Islam: Japanese 
Contribution to Islamic Studies – The Legacy of Toshihiko Izutsu, International Islamic University 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 5-7 August 2008, and is included in this volume, pp. 171-180. 
28 Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, p. 471. (emphasis added). 
29 See, for example, his Iḥyā’ ʿUlūm al-Dīn. 
30 See his Al-Risālah (Beyrut: Dār al-Jīl, 1990). 
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two works is almost, if not totally, the same, viz. about God and man.  
Instead, the “common language” or “philosophical ground” for a 
comparative study, or a dialogue, between Sufism and Taoism is only 
to be found easily and definitely in such thoughts of the mystics or 
philosophers as that of Ibn ʿArabī‟s. Perhaps this is that can best 
explain the reason of Izutsu‟s selection of Ibn ʿArabī. But 
unfortunately the “common language” of those mystics is 
unintelligible, and thus, unacceptable by the majority of the ṣūfīs, let 
alone the traditional Muslim thinkers. 
 
Conclusion  
Seen from a comparative perspective, Izutsu‟s Sufism and Taoism 
might be listed under the discipline of comparative study of religion 
(in the narrowest sense of the term). It is even more so as Professor 
Toshihiko Izutsu has made it clear in the introduction and conclusion 
of the book. Scholars in the discipline have painstakingly been 
discussing and debating on subjects pertaining to the approaches or 
methodologies appropriate to conduct the study in order to ascertain its 
objectivity and credibility. It is particularly this crucial issue of 
approach that this essay has tried to focus on by assessing Izutsu‟s 
contribution to the field. The main question of this essay has been the 
problem of “representation,” viz. how methodologically justifiable it is 
to do a comparative study between, on the one hand, the thought of Ibn 
ʿArabī as representative of Sufism which is “unorthodox” in the 
Sufistic trends, let alone in Islam, and on the other, that of Lao-tzŭ and 
Chuang-tzŭ as representative of “the main stream” of Taoism. 
Although the academic attempts made by this great scholar to 
explore and find alternative way that leads to the possibility of meta-
historical dialogues must be duly acknowledged and credited, but 
taking into account the issue of “representation” mentioned above and 
looking at the underlying motive and main objective of the 
comparative study undertaken by Izutsu in this work, one is 
sufficiently reasonably justified to cast doubt on the credibility and 
commendability of the approach used by him and, in turn, on the 
common ground he proposed.  
